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CAT SCRATCH FEVER: THE SPREAD OF THE CAT’S
PAW DOCTRINE IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Crystal Jackson-Kaloz+
The term “cat’s paw” comes from a seventeenth century fable about a
deceitful monkey and a gullible cat.1 The monkey convinces the cat to steal
chestnuts roasting in a fire so that they can eat them together. When the cat pulls
out the last chestnut, he turns around and discovers that the monkey has eaten
them all. The monkey received what he wanted with no risk to himself, leaving
the cat with nothing but a burnt paw.2
Judge Richard Posner inserted the term “cat’s paw” into employment
discrimination law when he used the term to describe situations where an
employer is vicariously liable for the discriminatory bias of its subordinate.3 In
2011, the Supreme Court adopted the “cat’s paw” doctrine in Staub v. Proctor
Hospital.4 However, the Supreme Court only applied the “cat’s paw” doctrine
to situations where an adverse employment decision5 was influenced by a
supervisor who possessed a discriminatory or retaliatory intent against the
employee but declined to consider whether the doctrine could be applied to
decisions influenced by a co-worker.6
+
J.D., Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, 2018. I would like to thank
my husband, Brian, for his love, patience, and understanding during the writing of this Note and
throughout law school. A very special thank you to my children, Kenzie, Baylee, and Wes for
putting up with my long hours away from home, being my biggest cheerleaders, and helping me
maintain my sanity during law school. The three of you inspire and motivate me every day. I
would especially like to thank my parents for the unconditional, love, support, and
encouragement they have given me all my life. Finally, I would like to thank the staff of The
Catholic University Law Review for their handwork and assistance in publishing this Note.
1. Jean de La Fontaine, The Monkey and the Cat, MUSÉE JEAN DE LA FONTAINE,
http://www.musee-jean-de-la-fontaine.fr/jean-de-la-fontaine-fable-uk-4.html (last visited Sept. 12,
2016); accord The Monkey and the Cat, AESOPICA: AESOP FOR CHILDREN, http://mythfolklo
re.net/aesopica/milowinter/61.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2018).
2. See sources cited supra note 1.
3. Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990).
4. 562 U.S. 411, 421–22 (2011).
5. The Second Circuit has broadly defined an “adverse employment action” to include:
termination, failing to hire or promote, demotion, reduction in pay, reprimand, and some lesser
actions. See Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 223 (2d Cir. 2001).
Moreover, although federal employment discrimination law encompasses multiple antidiscrimination statutes, the focus of this Note will center on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012)).
6. Staub, 562 U.S. at 422 n.4 (“We express no view as to whether the employer would be
liable if a co-worker, rather than a supervisor, committed a discriminatory act that influenced the
ultimate employment decision.”). For purposes of Title VII liability, the Supreme Court defined a
supervisor as a person that “is empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions
against the victim.” Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 424 (2013).
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On August 29, 2016, the Second Circuit expanded employer liability under
the “cat’s paw” doctrine in Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Service, Inc.7 to
include the impermissible bias of a non-supervisory employee when it influences
an employer’s adverse employment decision. In Vasquez, the plaintiff filed an
employment discrimination suit against her employer under both state and
federal law, claiming that she was wrongfully terminated in retaliation for filing
a sexual harassment complaint against a co-worker. Specifically, while the
employer investigated the plaintiff’s sexual harassment allegations, the coworker who was the subject of the complaint learned of the investigation.8 In
response, the co-worker presented false evidence to the employer, alleging that
he was the true victim of sexual harassment, and that it was the plaintiff who
sexually harassed him. Without further investigation and refusing to consider
plaintiff’s evidence, the employer made the decision to fire her based solely on
the self-serving evidence presented by the co-worker who was the subject of the
original complaint.9
The trial court, relying on Staub, granted the employer’s motion to dismiss
and held that the co-worker’s retaliatory intent could not be imputed to the
employer because he was not her supervisor.10 The Second Circuit reversed,
holding that an employee may succeed in a retaliation claim under a “cat’s paw”
theory “even absent evidence of illegitimate bias on the part of the ultimate
decision maker, so long as the [co-worker] shown to have [an] impermissible
bias played a meaningful role in the decision-making process.”11
This Note examines the Second Circuit’s decision extending the “cat’s paw”
doctrine to non-supervisory co-workers. Part I provides an overview of the
“cat’s paw” doctrine and discusses prior case law underlying the decision. Part
II provides a factual summary of Vasquez and the Second Circuit’s rationale.
Part III explains why the Second Circuit’s holding was correct and suggests there
is a need to define what a proper independent investigation entails. Finally, this
Note concludes by recommending measures employers should adopt to
minimize the risk of a “cat’s paw” claim.
I. TITLE VII, AGENCY LAW, AND CAT’S PAW DOCTRINE
A. Where the Term “Cat’s Paw” Originates and What It Means
In the 1990 decision Shager v. Upjohn Co.,12 Seventh Circuit Judge Richard
Posner introduced the concept of “cat’s paw” liability when he used the term to
7. 835 F.3d 267 (2d Cir. 2016).
8. Id. at 270.
9. Id. at 270–71.
10. Id. at 271–72.
11. Id. at 272 (quoting Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 143 (2d Cir. 2008)) (“Such a
role is surely played by an employee who ‘manipulates’ an employer into acting as mere ‘conduit’
for his retaliatory intent.”).
12. 913 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1990).
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describe situations where an employer is vicariously liable for the discriminatory
bias of its subordinate.13
In Shager, a fifty-three-year-old salesman filed a wrongful termination suit
under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).14 The
employee in Shager, a salesman for a seed manufacturing company, claimed his
supervisor assigned him a tougher sales territory, treated him unfairly compared
to younger salesmen, and recommended his termination despite his outstanding
sales performance.15 The employer argued the committee that made the ultimate
decision to terminate the employee did not have any bias toward him; therefore,
it could not be liable even if the supervisor’s recommendation to terminate was
based on the employee’s age.16 The court used well-established principles of
agency law to hold that employers may be held liable when a biased supervisor
influences an adverse employment action, even if the supervisor does not make
the ultimate decision.17
Today, the term “cat’s paw” is regularly used in employment discrimination
cases to refer to situations where an employee has been subjected to an adverse
employment decision by his or her employer (the gullible cat)—who has no
discriminatory or retaliatory bias—but who has been manipulated or influenced
by a subordinate supervisor (the deceitful monkey) who does possess an
impermissible discriminatory or retaliatory bias.18
B. Agency Law and Title VII Claims
Because there is no statute that specifically addresses vicarious liability for
employment discrimination or retaliation claims, courts have developed the
doctrine through case law. However, the substantive basis for such claims are
found under federal anti-discrimination statutes such as Title VII of the Civil
Rights of 1964 (Title VII).19 Title VII makes it unlawful to discriminate against
13. Id. at 405.
14. Pub. L. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. ch. 14 (2012)).
15. Shager, 913 F.2d at 399–400. The territory Shager was assigned consisted of poor quality
farmland, and consequently the demand for seeds was low. Despite being assigned to the territory
with the worst sales potential, Shager surpassed the sales goals set for him and those of the salesmen
assigned to territories with better sales potential. Id. at 400.
16. Id. at 404.
17. Id. at 404–05 (holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a
supervisor’s age-based bias tainted the committee’s decision to fire the plaintiff).
18. See Sara Eber, Comment, How Much Power Should Be in the Paw? Independent
Investigations and the Cat’s Paw Doctrine, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 141, 146 (2008); accord Patrick
Dorrian, Watch Out for Witness Bias in Workplace Investigations, BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 2,
2016), https://www.bna.com/watch-witness-bias-n73014447157/.
19. Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(2012)). In addition to Title VII, Congress enacted other anti-discrimination statutes “to deter
workplace discrimination and allow plaintiffs to recover for unlawful workplace discrimination.”
See Michael L. Fessinger, Note, Balancing the Reasonable Requirements of Employers and
Veterans Living with Traumatic Brain Injury—The Modern U.S. Military’s “Signature Injury” is
a Game Changer, 53 WASHBURN L.J. 327, 339 (2014) (citing ADEA, 29 U.S.C. ch. 14 (2012));
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an employee on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.20 Title
VII also contains a provision prohibiting retaliation by an employer against
employees who file discrimination charges or otherwise engage in protected
activity.21
Congress directed courts to interpret Title VII claims using agency
principles.22 Courts regularly apply section 219 of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency (the Restatement) to determine when an employer is liable for the
actions of its employees.23 The section provides that:
(1) A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants
committed while acting in the scope of their employment.
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting
outside the scope of their employment, unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated non-delegable duty of the master, or

Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), Pub. L. 103353, 108 Stat. 3149 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C. (2012)); Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101–213 (2012)); and Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), Pub. L. 103-3, 107
Stat. 6 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. ch. 28 (2012))). The ADA protects employees with
disabilities by placing “an affirmative obligation on the employer to help employees perform the
‘essential functions’ of a job,” and the FMLA prevents employers from dismissing an employee
when he or she takes time away from work to manage personal or family illness. 42 U.S.C. §§
12101-213; 28 U.S.C. ch. 28.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2).
21. Id. § 2000e-3(a). A retaliation claim is a separate claim and may proceed even if the
underlying discrimination claim fails. See, e.g., Sims v. MME Paulette Dry Cleaners, 580 F. Supp.
593, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (“Under Title VII, the act of retaliation is a separate violation, in and of
itself, without regard to the plaintiff’s success or failure on the merits of the underlying
discrimination claim.”). To prove a retaliation case under Title VII, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that
she engaged in activity protected by Title VII, (2) that an adverse employment action occurred, and
(3) that a causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Gee v. Principi,
289 F.3d 342, 345 (5th Cir. 2002).
22. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 791 (1998) (“[The] definition of
employer in Title VII, as including an ‘agent,’ expressed Congress’s intent that courts look to
traditional principles of the law of agency in devising standards of employer liability . . . .” (internal
citations omitted)); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (“Congress wanted
courts to look to agency principles for guidance in this area. . . . Congress’s decision to define
‘employer’ to include any ‘agent’ of an employer surely evinces an intent to place some limits on
the acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible.” (internal
citation omitted)); accord Glen Allen Staszewski, Using Agency Principles for Guidance in
Finding Employer Liability for A Supervisor’s Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment, 48
VAND. L. REV. 1057, 1067 (1995).
23. See, e.g., Faragher, 524 U.S. at 777 (concluding in the context of a hostile work
environment case that “§219(2)(d) provides an appropriate starting point for determining liability”);
EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 487–88 (10th Cir. 2006) (relying on
purpose of section 219 to determine causation standard of employer subordinate liability).
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(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the
principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or
he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of
the agency relation.24
Section 219(1) establishes traditional vicarious liability in the employment
context by holding an employer automatically liable if an employee’s challenged
conduct falls within the scope of his employment.25 Whether conduct is within
the scope of employment is generally determined by whether the conduct is
performed “at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master.”26 However, an
employee’s discriminatory or retaliatory conduct is typically never done with
the purpose of serving the employer but, instead, is done solely for personal
reasons, and courts often view such conduct as being outside the scope of
employment.27 Thus, courts look to section 219(2) to determine if there are other
justifications to hold an employer vicariously liable for the impermissible
actions of the employee.28 In the absence of a statutory definition of vicarious
liability within Title VII, courts have wide discretion to determine “when the
employer is to be held liable for . . . its employees’ actions, and [what] standard
of liability to impose on employers for the [impermissible] acts of their
employees.”29
C. Vicarious Liability Standard for Employment Discrimination Defined
The Supreme Court defined the standard for employer liability where an
employee’s conduct is outside the scope of his employment in Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth.30 In that case, Kimberly Ellerth worked as a

24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
25. Id. § 219(1); see also Jennifer K. Weinhold, Note, Beyond the Traditional Scope-ofEmployment Analysis in the Clergy Sexual Abuse Context, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 531, 539
(2009) (“[T]raditional [agency] analysis maintains that ‘if an employee wholly abandons, even
temporarily, the employer’s business for personal reasons, the act is not within the scope of
employment, and the employer is not liable under respondeat superior for the employee’s conduct
during that lapse.’” (quoting O’Shea v. Welch, 350 F.3d 1101, 1105 (10th Cir. 2003))).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(1)(c). For guidance in determining whether
conduct falls “within the scope of employment,” see id. §§ 229–37.
27. See Burlington Indus., Inc., v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 759 (1998) (stating that harassment
is not within the scope of employment because harassment is not motivated by intent to serve the
employer).
28. Entente Mineral Co. v. Parker, 956 F.2d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he principal’s
liability is based on the theory embodied in §§ 219(2)(d) and 261 of the Restatement, rather than
traditional ‘scope of employment’ liability contained in § 219(1).”); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co.,
833 F.2d 1406, 1418 (10th Cir. 1987) (“Although § 219(1) of the Restatement of Agency provides
scant assistance in assessing employer liability under Title VII, § 219(2) is more helpful.”).
29. Justin P. Smith, Note, Letting the Master Answer: Employer Liability for Sexual
Harassment in the Workplace After Faragher and Burlington Industries, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1786,
1789 (1999).
30. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758–59.
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salesperson for Burlington Industries.31 As part of her duties, Ellerth was
required to speak regularly with Ted Slowik, the vice president of sales and
marketing.32 Ellerth alleged that she was sexually harassed by Slowik on a
constant basis33 and eventually resigned because of it.34 Although, Slowik had
limited authority to make hiring and promotion decisions, Slowik was not
Ellerth’s direct supervisor. However, her supervisor reported directly to
Slowik.35
The Supreme Court in Ellerth applied principles of agency law to hold that an
employer may be held liable for the improper conduct of an employee’s actions
that are outside the scope of his or her employment in two instances.36 First,
under section 219(2)(d) of the Restatement, the employer may be held liable if
the employee was “aided in accomplishing [his improper act] by the existence
of the agency relationship.”37 Second, under section 219(2)(b), an employer
may be liable when an employee’s improper conduct “is attributable to the
employer’s own negligence.”38

31. Id. at 747.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 747–48. Ellerth alleged: (1) after Slowik made remarks about her breasts, she
ignored him but, in response, he told her to “loosen” up and warned her that he could make her life
easy or hard at Burlington Industries; (2) during an interview for a promotion, Slowik told her he
was concerned about her promotion because she was not “loose enough” and rubbed her knee; and
(3) when Slowik informed her by telephone that she received the promotion she was seeking, he
added that she would be working with men in factories and that they “like women with pretty
butts/legs.” Id.
34. Initially Ellerth’s stated grounds for resignation were unrelated to Slowik’s conduct, but
three weeks later, she alleged that her resignation was motivated by the sexual harassment she
experienced from Slowik. Id. at 748–49.
35. Id. at 747.
36. Id. at 758 (“Scope of employment does not define the only basis for employer liability
under agency principles [and] [i]n limited circumstances, agency principles impose liability on
employers even where employees commit torts outside the scope of employment.”).
37. Id. at 760 (noting that most employees are “aided in accomplishing their tortious
objectives” because of the close proximity and regular contact provided by the employment
relationship and would not have had access to the injured plaintiff otherwise). Under the “aided in
accomplishing” standard, the Court “evaluates the principal’s liability based on the degree to which
the employment relationship facilitated the employee’s intentional tort.” Weinhold, supra note 25,
at 540.
38. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758. Section 213 of the Restatement states:
A person conducting an activity through servants or other agents is subject to liability for
harm resulting from his conduct if he is negligent or reckless:
(a) in giving improper or ambiguous orders of [sic] in failing to make
proper regulations; or
(b) in the employment of improper persons or instrumentalities in work
involving risk of harm to others; or
(c) in the supervision of the activity; or
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D. Judicial Development of the Cat’s Paw Doctrine
1. The Circuits Split Hairs over the Causation Standard
Following Judge Posner’s holding in Shager, “most circuits have adopted
some form of the cat’s paw doctrine.”39 However, those courts have applied
inconsistent standards regarding the level of influence over the adverse
employment decision that is necessary for an employee’s impermissible bias to
be imputed to the employer.40 In Shager, because the firing decision was made
by an independent committee—rather than the allegedly biased supervisor—the
court focused on whether the supervisor’s impermissible prejudice “tainted” the
committee’s decision. If the non-firing supervisor’s bias had any influence in
the committee’s decision to fire Shager, then a “causal link between that
prejudice and Shager’s discharge” exists sufficient to impute liability to the
employer.41
Although several circuits adopted the “any influence” approach used in
Shager,42 the Fourth Circuit adopted the strictest approach, which requires the
biased subordinate to be “principally responsible for the decision or the actual
decision-maker for the employer.”43 Notably, the Tenth Circuit established a
middle-ground approach that requires a “causal connection” between the biased
subordinate’s actions and the adverse employment action.44
2. Supreme Court Accepts the Cat’s Paw Doctrine and Creates a New
Standard
The U.S. Supreme Court resolved the circuit split in Staub v. Proctor
Hospital.45 However, instead of adopting one of the three standards established
(d) in permitting, or failing to prevent, negligent or other tortious conduct
by persons, whether or not his servants or agents, upon premises or with
instrumentalities under his control.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
39. Eber, supra note 18, at 147; accord Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., 354 F.3d
277, 289 (4th Cir. 2004) (recognizing Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1990), as the
predecessor to other courts’ application of the “cat’s paw” doctrine).
40. See Eber, supra note 18, at 147, 154–75 (discussing the different standards of causation
used by the courts).
41. Shager, 913 F.2d at 405.
42. See, e.g., Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 55 (1st Cir.
2000) (direct supervisor was in position to influence the decision-maker); Rose v. N.Y.C. Bd. of
Educ., 257 F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir. 2001) (immediate supervisor had “enormous influence” in the
decision-making process).
43. Hill, 354 F.3d at 290 (holding that a subordinate must possess some kind of supervisory
authority and must be the actual decision-maker of the adverse employment decision).
44. EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 487–88 (10th Cir. 2006)
(holding that more than mere influence and more than mere input must be established in the
decision-making process to satisfy the element of causation).
45. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 418 (2011).
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by the circuit courts, the Supreme Court established a new “proximate cause”
standard for analyzing a “cat’s paw” theory of liability.46
In that case, plaintiff Vincent Staub was an angiography technician at Proctor
Hospital and a member of the U.S. Army Reserve.47 As an Army Reserve
soldier, Staub was required to be absent from Proctor Hospital to attend monthly
drills and one two-week training session during the year.48 Staub claimed that
his immediate supervisor Jane Mulally and her supervisor Michael Korenchuk
harbored hostility toward him because of his military obligations and consequent
absences from work.49
Specifically, he alleged that Mulally issued a Corrective Action against him
for fabricated reasons.50 Then, shortly thereafter, another co-worker filed a
complaint with the Vice-President of Human Resources Linda Buck and the
Chief Operating Officer Garrett McGowen regarding Staub’s “frequent
unavailability and abruptness.” As a result, McGowen directed Buck and
Korenchuk to develop a performance improvement plan to remedy Staub’s
“unavailability problems.”51 However, before the plan could be put into place,

46. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia posited:
Proximate cause requires only “some direct relation between the injury asserted and the
injurious conduct alleged,” and excludes only those “link[s] that [are] too remote, purely
contingent, or indirect.” We do not think that the ultimate decisionmaker’s exercise of
judgment automatically renders the link to the supervisor’s bias “remote” or “purely
contingent.” The decisionmaker’s exercise of judgment is also a proximate cause of the
employment decision, but it is common for injuries to have multiple proximate causes.
Id. at 419–20 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Hemi
Group, LLC v. City of N.Y., 559 U.S. 1, 9 (2010)).
47. Id. at 413.
48. Id. at 413–14.
49. Id. at 414. Mulally often scheduled Staub to work during his mandatory training sessions
or made him use vacation time “so that he would ‘pa[y] back the department for everyone else
having to bend over backwards to cover [his] schedule.’” She also openly discussed her discontent
with Staub’s “military duty” and her desire to “get rid of him” with other staff members. Likewise,
Korenchuk expressed his discontent with Staub’s military service by referring to his obligations to
the military as “a b[u]nch of smoking and joking and [a] waste of taxpayers[‘] money.” Id.
(alteration in original).
50. The Corrective Action was a “disciplinary warning for purportedly violating a company
rule requiring him to stay in his work area whenever he was not working with a patient.” Id. In
litigation, Staub contended that “Mulally’s justification for the Corrective Action was false for two
reasons: [1] the company rule invoked by Mulally did not exist; and [2] even if it did, Staub did not
violate it.” Id.
51. Id.
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Korenchuk filed another complaint against Staub claiming that he violated the
Corrective Action,52 and Buck fired him.53
Staub filed suit against Proctor Hospital under the Uniformed Services
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA)54 claiming that
Mulally and Korenchuck’s complaints were motivated by their anti-military
bias, which influenced Buck’s decision to fire him.55 The jury found in favor of
Staub, and Proctor Hospital appealed to the Seventh Circuit.56 The Seventh
Circuit reversed, holding that an employer may be held liable only where a
biased supervisor exercised “singular influence” over the decision maker, and
the adverse employment decision was made in “blind reliance” on the
supervisor’s actions.57
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court applied tort and agency
principles to hold that liability could be imputed to an employer under the “cat’s
paw” doctrine: “[I]f a supervisor performs an act motivated by antimilitary
animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment
action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action,
then the employer is liable under USERRA.”58 The Court suggested that an
employer may be able to avoid “cat’s paw” liability if an independent
investigation uncovers a legitimate reason for the adverse employment decision
that is “unrelated to the supervisor’s original biased action.”59 However, the

52. In his complaint, Korenchuk alleged that Staub violated Mulally’s previously issued
Corrective Action by leaving his desk without informing a supervisor. At trial, Staub contended
that the “accusation was false: He had left Korenchuk a voice-mail notification that he was leaving
his desk.” Id. at 414–15.
53. Id. at 415 (“Buck relied on Korenchuk’s accusation, however, and after reviewing Staub’s
personnel file, she decided to fire him.”).
54. Pub. L. 103-353, 108 Stat. 3149 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.
(2012)). The purpose of USERRA is to protect veterans who are rejoining the workforce after
completing their military service obligations from anti-military discrimination in the workplace.
For an in-depth discussion regarding USERRA, see Elizabeth A. Leyda, Note, The War(riors) at
Home: Examining USERRA’s Veterans’ Reemployment Protections When Hostility Follows
Soldiers to the Workplace, 28 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 851, 852 (2012).
55. Staub, 562 U.S. at 414–15.
56. Id. at 415.
57. Id. at 415–16.
58. Id. at 422 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
59. Specifically, the Court posited that,
if the employer’s investigation results in an adverse action for reasons unrelated to the
supervisor’s original biased action . . . , then the employer will not be liable. But the
supervisor’s biased report may remain a causal factor if the independent investigation
takes it into account without determining that the adverse action was, apart from the
supervisor’s recommendation, entirely justified. We are aware of no principle in tort or
agency law under which an employer’s mere conduct of an independent investigation has
a claim-preclusive effect. Nor do we think the independent investigation somehow
relieves the employer of “fault.”
Id.
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Court failed to provide guidance on what a sufficient independent investigation
entails.
Although the Court significantly clarified the standard for “cat’s paw” claims
involving supervisors, it declined to consider whether a “cat’s paw” claim could
be made for an adverse employment action caused by the bias of a low-level,
non-supervisory co-worker.60
E. Judicial Expansion of the Cat’s Paw Doctrine
The question left unanswered by Staub has caused mixed results among the
courts regarding the imputed bias of a co-worker under the “cat’s paw” doctrine.
For example, lower courts within the Fourth and Seventh Circuits have indicated
some support for extending “cat’s paw” liability to the impermissible bias of
non-supervisory employees.61 However, courts in the Sixth and Tenth Circuits
have opposed extending the doctrine to encompass non-supervisory
employees.62
The First Circuit, in Velázquez-Perez v. Developers Diversified Realty
Corp.,63 was the first federal circuit court to decide that a “cat’s paw” claim can
proceed against an employer if a co-worker’s discriminatory intent influences
an adverse employment decision. In that case, Antonio Velázquez-Perez filed a
Title VII claim against his former employer for sex discrimination and
retaliation.64 He alleged that Rosa Martinez, a human resources (HR)
representative, devised a scheme to get him fired after he rejected her romantic
advances.65 Velázquez claimed that he and Martinez were friendly and often
exchanged e-mails that were sometimes flirtatious.66 However, Martinez
“expressed her romantic interest more explicitly” when she tried to gain entrance

60. Id. at 422 n.4 (“We express no view as to whether the employer would be liable if a coworker, rather than a supervisor, committed the discriminatory act that influenced the ultimate
employment decision.”).
61. See, e.g., Alamjamili v. Berglund Chevrolet, Inc., No. 7:09-CV-213, 2011 WL 1479101,
at *31–32 n.3 (W.D. Va. Apr. 18, 2011) (holding that because the plaintiff never alleged that any
other person influenced his admittedly non-biased supervisor’s decision to fire him, Staub’s “cat’s
paw” theory of liability was not applicable); Johnson v. Koppers, Inc., No. 10 C 3404, 2012 WL
1906448, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 12, 2012) (finding that Staub “neither precludes nor endorses” claims
based on whether a non-supervisory co-worker’s impermissible bias can me imputed to the
employer under the “cat’s paw” doctrine).
62. See, e.g., Hysten v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 415 F. App’x 897, 912 (10th Cir.
2011) (finding no cat’s paw liability because the biased actors were the plaintiff’s co-workers with
“no supervisory authority or influence with respect to [the plaintiff], including authority or
influence relating to employee discipline”); Voltz v. Erie Cty., 617 Fed. App’x 417, 424 (6th Cir.
2015) (recognizing that the Sixth Circuit only extends cat’s paw liability to Human Resources
employees because, like supervisors, they can “effect a significant change in employment status”).
63. 753 F.3d 265 (1st Cir. 2014).
64. Id. at 267.
65. Id. at 267–69.
66. Id. at 268.
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into his room during a business trip. He told her then that he was not interested
in a romantic relationship.67
Shortly after the trip, Martinez began sending Velázquez angry e-mails
threatening his job security.68 Velázquez mentioned the e-mails to one of his
supervisors who told him to send her a “conciliatory e-mail” so that she would
not “get [him] terminated”; his supervisor and another man proceeded to
jokingly advise him to have sex with Martinez.69 During this time, Martinez
also began complaining about Velázquez’s work performance to his
supervisors.70 When her complaints only resulted in a warning memorandum
and the issuance of a Performance Improvement Plan, she went over the
supervisors’ heads by filing a complaint and recommendation for termination
with senior officials at the company’s headquarters.71 Shortly thereafter,
Velázquez was fired.72
The First Circuit determined that the employer was not “necessarily
absolve[d] . . . of potential liability for Velázquez’s discharge” simply because
Martinez was not his supervisor.73 Applying negligence-based agency
principles, the First Circuit held that:
an employer can be held liable under Title VII if: the plaintiff’s coworker makes statements maligning the plaintiff, for discriminatory
reasons and with the intent to cause the plaintiff’s firing; the coworker’s discriminatory acts proximately cause the plaintiff to be
fired; and the employer acts negligently by allowing the co-worker’s

67. Specifically, the record indicated that Martinez followed Velázquez to his room, tried to
force her way in, and stood outside of his door until he threatened to call hotel security.
Immediately after, Martinez sent Velázquez several e-mails and also e-mailed another female
employee who she saw him talking to earlier “suggesting that Velázquez was going to have sex
with the woman.” Id.
68. In the days that followed the rejection at the hotel, Martinez and Velázquez exchanged
several e-mails in which he “firmly stated that he had no interest in a romantic relationship and
asked Martinez to respect that decision.” Id. In response,
Martinez wrote, for example, “I don’t have to take revenge on anyone; if somebody
knows your professional weaknesses, that person is me.” In another e-mail in the same
chain, [she] said, “you disappoint me and . . . are not even half of what you boast you
are,” adding, “I cannot allow any of you to risk the team’s success.”
Id.
69. Id. at 268.
70. Id. at 269.
71. During another business trip, Martinez once again followed Velázquez to his hotel room
and told him that she loved him and not her husband. After Velázquez rejected her again, she sent
an e-mail to the company’s senior officials in Ohio stating that “because [Velázquez’s] behavior
has been against the company code of conduct and has already impacted the trust from other team
members . . . [i]t is my recommendation this person [be] terminated immediately.” Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 273.
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acts to achieve their desired effect though it knows (or reasonably
should know) of the discriminatory motivation.74
II. EXPANSION OF THE CAT’S PAW DOCTRINE CONTINUES IN THE SECOND
CIRCUIT
On August 29, 2016, the Second Circuit issued its opinion in Vasquez v.
Empress Ambulance Service, Inc., and joined the First Circuit in expanding the
scope of the “cat’s paw” doctrine to co-workers.75
A. The Facts
In Vasquez, Andrea Vasquez had been working as an emergency medical
technician for Empress Ambulance Service, Inc. (Empress) for only a few
months when she met Tyrell Gray, one of the company’s dispatchers.76 Gray
began flirting with Vasquez shortly after they met. His flirting made Vasquez
uncomfortable, and she repeatedly denied his requests to go out.77 A few months
later, Gray again asked her out, to which Vasquez replied that she had a
boyfriend and was not interested in dating him.78 Gray told her that he would
send her something special later that night that would make her forget about her
boyfriend.79
While Vasquez was out on a shift, Gray sent Vasquez a picture of his erect
penis, asking her what she thought. When Vasquez returned to the office, she
was visibly upset and immediately told her supervisor.80 The supervisor put her
in an office to type out a formal complaint and assured her that the situation
would be dealt with. When Gray returned to the office, he noticed Vasquez
crying at the computer.81 He asked her if she was reporting him. After she
ignored him, he left.82
Once Vasquez completed her report, she met with her supervisor and the HR
director. As she recounted her story, she offered to show them the text messages

74. Id. at 274.
75. Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Serv. Inc., 835 F.3d 267, 276 (2d Cir. 2016).
76. Id. at 269.
77. Id. at 269–70 (“Over the course of their acquaintance, Gray ‘constantly asked [Vasquez]
out on dates,’ ‘attempted to flirt with her,’ and ‘repeatedly . . . put his arm around her or touched
her shoulders,’ causing Vasquez ‘to be extremely uncomfortable’ as she tried to reject his
advances.” (alteration in original)).
78. Id. at 270.
79. When Vasquez told him she had a boyfriend, he “insisted that ‘I bet I can make you leave
your man’ and promised to ‘send . . . something between you and me.’” Id. (alteration in original).
80. Id.
81. Gray walked into the office, “to see a visually distressed [Vasquez] crying and typing at
the computer. Gray, noticeably nervous, asked Vasquez if she was ok and, after Vasquez declined
to engage his attempts at conversation, stated, You’re reporting me, right?” Id. (internal quotations
omitted).
82. Id.
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from Gray;83 however, both declined the invitation.84 While Vasquez made her
report, Gray frantically sought to undermine her report. After telling another coworker that he thought Vasquez was reporting him, he asked that co-worker to
tell their supervisor that he and Vasquez were in relationship.85
When the co-worker refused, Gray began doctoring his text messages to make
it seem as if he and Vasquez were in a sexual relationship by combining screen
shots of portions of his conversations with Vasquez and another woman.86 He
printed the screenshots and showed them to the supervisor and a representative
from HR. He included a racy self-photo of a woman with only a small portion
of her face visible claiming it was Vasquez and that she had sent him the photo
in response to his photo.87
Shortly after Gray met with HR, Vasquez had a meeting with her union
representatives, the owner of Empress, and HR to discuss the investigation.88
She was told they spoke with Gray, and after considering his evidence, they
determined she had been in an “inappropriate sexual relationship” with him.
They then informed her she was being fired for engaging in sexual harassment.89
Although Vasquez vehemently denied the accusations and urged them to look at
her cell phone as proof that no such conversations between her and Gray ever
occurred, they refused. Additionally, she denied the existence of any photo, and
when she requested to see it, they refused her request.90
Vasquez filed suit against Empress under Title VII and the New York State
Human Rights Law claiming she was wrongfully terminated in retaliation for
her sexual harassment complaint.91 Empress filed a motion to dismiss, which
the district court, applying Staub, granted and dismissed Vasquez’s complaint
83. The supervisor and HR director “thanked Vasquez for ‘telling [her] story,’ assured her
that, ‘[w]e don’t tolerate this sort of behavior here,’ and promised to ‘sort the situation out.’”
84. The court noted that after this exchange:
To aid in their investigation, Vasquez offered to show the supervisors Gray’s messages
on her cell phone, but they rejected the offer. They then asked Vasquez whether she
preferred to go home or to wait in the office while they investigated the incident that
morning, and Vasquez elected to wait.
Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 271.
88. Id. at 270.
89. Id. at 270–71 (“[T]he [investigative] committee had already considered Gray’s documents
and had concluded that Vasquez was ‘having an inappropriate sexual relationship’ with Gray.”).
90. Vasquez was informed “that Gray had shown them ‘a racy self-taken photo’ that Vasquez
had allegedly sent in response to Gray’s explicit picture message, which they considered ‘proof that
[Vasquez] had been sexually harassing [Gray]’” After denying the allegation and contending that
Gray was lying, the firing supervisor “insisted that ‘the committee had all seen the photograph’ and
‘kn[ew] it was [her in the photo].’”—despite the fact that the “photo depicted only ‘a small fraction
of a face’ that could ‘by no means [be] concluded to be that of [Vasquez].’” Id.
91. Although Vasquez involves claims on both state and federal anti-discrimination statutes,
this Note focuses exclusively on federal anti-discrimination law.
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on grounds that Gray’s retaliatory intent could not be imputed to Empress
because he was not her supervisor.92
B. The Holding
The Second Circuit “vacated the [district] court’s decision and remand[ed]
[Vasquez’s claim] for further proceedings.”93 Writing for the court, Circuit
Judge Calabresi employed the negligence-based agency principles used in
Ellerth to hold that employers may be held liable under the “cat’s paw” doctrine
for an employee’s discriminatory or retaliatory bias—regardless of the
employee’s position in the company—if the employer negligently gives effect
to the unlawful bias by causing the “victim to suffer an adverse employment
decision.”94
The Second Circuit supported its decision by relying on the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Ellerth, notwithstanding the fact that Ellerth involved a hostile
work environment claim.95 Judge Calabresi explained:
Significantly, in addressing employer culpability for employee
misconduct, the Ellerth Court expressly noted that Section 219(2)(b)
[of the Restatement] holds employers liable “when the [employee’s]
tort is attributable to the employer’s own negligence. Thus, although
a[n employee’s] sexual harassment is outside the scope of
employment . . . , an employer can be liable, nonetheless, where its
own negligence is a cause of the harassment[, . . . i.e.,] if it knew or
should have known about the conduct but failed to stop it.”96
Analogizing Vasquez’s Title VII claim to the sexual harassment claim in
Ellerth, Judge Calabresi determined that Gray’s status as a low-level employee
could not “shield Empress from [liability] for Gray’s conduct” because, “under
Ellerth and agency law,” Gray was an agent of Empress sufficient to “hold
Empress accountable for his unlawful intent.”97
Focusing on Empress’s “blind faith” reliance on Gray’s accusations and its
failure to give any consideration to Vasquez’s contradictory evidence, the
Second Circuit found that a reasonable jury could find that Empress had been
negligent in firing Vasquez.98 However, it noted that an employer does not
92. Vasquez, 835 F.3d at 269.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 269, 273–74.
95. Id. at 273 (citing Burlington Indus., Inc., v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 758–59 (1998)) (“We
see no reason why Ellerth, though written in the context of hostile work environment, should not
also be read to hold an employer liable under Title VII . . . .”).
96. Id. at 273 (alteration in original) (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758–59).
97. Id. at 274 (“Once deemed Empress’s agent, Gray stands in the same shoes as Staub’s
‘supervisor,’ and is equally able to play the monkey to Empress’s cat.”).
98. Id. at 276. The Second Circuit determined that Empress’s failure to fully investigate the
matter—by refusing to consider Vasquez’s evidence—constituted negligence that gave effect to
Gray’s impermissible motive. Id. at 274 n.6.
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automatically expose itself to liability by acting on information provided by a
biased employee, instead courts must consider whether the employee’s bias
played a meaningful role in the adverse decision.99 It explained that employers
“can still ‘just get it wrong’ without incurring liability under Title VII,” they just
cannot get it wrong by negligently allowing “itself to be used as a [cat’s paw]
for even a low-level employee’s” improper bias.100
III. SECOND CIRCUIT DECISION WAS CORRECT TO EXPAND THE CAT’S PAW
DOCTRINE TO CO-WORKERS
The Second Circuit’s decision to expand an employer’s “cat’s paw” liability
to discriminatory or retaliatory acts of its co-workers is consistent with the
purpose of Title VII and agency principles.
A. The Decision Is Consistent with the Purpose of Title VII
The primary purpose of Title VII is to avoid harm to employees by ridding
the workplace of discrimination and any retaliation that may follow for reporting
acts of discrimination.101 Restricting discrimination and retaliation claims to
only the discriminatory acts of a biased supervisor while allowing the same
discriminatory acts of co-workers clearly undermines the goals of Title VII.102
Further, the Second Circuit noted that in accordance with Title VII precedent,
plaintiffs are entitled to succeed on claims of discrimination against even non99. Id. at 275–76. The Second Circuit noted that:
Empress’s alleged negligence—in crediting Gray’s accusations to the exclusion of all
other evidence, and specifically declining to examine contrary evidence tendered by
Vasquez, when it knew or, with reasonable investigation, should have known of Gray’s
retaliatory animus—caused Gray’s accusations to form the sole basis for Empress’s
decision to terminate Vasquez. Thus, as a result of Empress’s negligence, Gray achieved
a “meaningful,” and indeed decisive, role in Vasquez’s termination.
Id. at 275.
100. Id. (stating that courts consider “what ‘motivated’ the employer rather than . . . ‘the truth
of the allegations’” the employer relied upon).
101. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764 (“Title VII is designed to encourage the creation of antiharassment policies and effective grievance mechanisms.”); accord EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466
U.S. 54, 77 (1984) (“The dominant purpose of [Title VII], of course, is to root out discrimination
in employment.”).
102. This point was best illustrated by a case out of the D.C. Circuit, which explained:
To hold that an employer cannot be reached for Title VII violations unknown to him is,
too, to open the door to circumvention of Title VII by the simple expedient of looking
the other way, even as signs of discriminatory practice begin to gather on the horizon.
As the Ninth Circuit has said, “such a rule would create an enormous loophole in the
statutes,” one we think the courts should strive to seal. Instead of providing a reason for
employers to remain oblivious to conditions in the workplace, we think the enlightened
purpose of Title VII calls for an interpretation cultivating an incentive for employers to
take a more active role in warranting to each employee that he or she will enjoy a working
environment free from illegal . . . discrimination.
Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff’d sub nom. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
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biased employers as long as the biased individual “played a meaningful role in
the [decision-making] process.” It then relied on that reasoning to hold that an
employee clearly plays a meaningful role when he “‘manipulates’ an employer
into acting as mere ‘conduit’ for his [impermissible] intent.”103
B. The Decision Is Consistent with Principles of Agency Law
The Supreme Court in Ellerth and Staub make clear that agency principles
govern the “cat’s paw” doctrine.104 As mentioned above, the Supreme Court in
Staub determined that a supervisor is an agent of the employer by applying
Section 219(1) of the Restatement because it found that the supervisors in Staub
were acting within the scope of their employment. It did not, however, adopt a
bright-line rule to impute liability to the employer exclusively for the
impermissible bias of supervisors.105
Pursuant to section 219(2)(b) of the Restatement, an employer is subject to
liability for the torts of its employees even when acting outside the scope of their
employment, if it is found that the employer was “negligent or reckless.”106
Although Gray’s manipulative conduct was well outside the scope of his
employment, Empress’s negligence in the matter could give rise to liability for
Gray’s retaliatory motive. Particularly, because Vasquez filed a sexual
harassment complaint against him just a few hours before, a reasonable
employer would suspect or should suspect that Gray had a retaliatory motive in
proffering his evidence.107 Therefore, by refusing to consider the counterevidence proffered by Vasquez, Empress “negligently chose to credit his, and
only his, account” in deciding to terminate Vasquez.108
Thus, in reaching its decision, the Second Circuit correctly applied Title VII
precedent and section 219(2)(b) of the Restatement to determine that the “cat’s
paw” doctrine extends employer liability to the actions of co-workers when the
employer negligently gives effect to the co-worker’s discriminatory or
retaliatory intent.

103. Vasquez, 835 F.3d at 272.
104. Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 411, 422 (2011); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764–65.
105. Staub, 562 U.S. at 422–23 & n.4 (“We express no view as to whether the employer would
be liable if a co-worker, rather than a supervisor, committed a discriminatory act that influenced
the ultimate employment decision.”).
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
107. The nature and timing of Gray’s evidence was suspicious. Only a few hours had passed
from the time of Gray sending the text message and Vasquez filing her complaint, yet, Gray
conveniently was carrying around printed screenshots of his text messages with Vasquez.
Appellant’s Brief at 20–21, Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Serv. Inc., 835 F.3d 267 (2d Cir.
2016). In addition, Gray told his supervisors and HR that Vasquez sent the racy photo to him in
response to his text. However, Vasquez was out on a shift when she received the text, filed her
complaint immediately upon her return, and waited in the office until her meeting with the
supervisors and HR. Id. at 20–21.
108. Vasquez, 835 F.3d at 275.
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C. Independent Investigation Guidelines Still Needed
Independent investigations are a crucial step in protecting employers against
“cat’s paw” claims. Courts have implied that employers are likely to be absolved
of “cat’s paw” liability where a sufficient independent investigation shows the
adverse employment action was based on reasons wholly unrelated to the
original bias.109 In other words, an independent investigation may sever the link
of causation between the biased employee and the adverse employment
action.110
For example, if in the course conducting an independent investigation of
Gray’s claims, Empress had discovered that Vasquez was guilty of violating the
company’s policy regarding cell phone use while driving an ambulance,
Empress would be less likely to be found liable under the “cat’s paw” doctrine.
Well-defined standards for independent investigations would provide employers
with an effective defense to “cat’s paw” claims and reduce the risk of
litigation.111 Furthermore, encouraging independent investigations promotes the
purpose of Title VII—ridding the workplace of discrimination.112 Thus, the
Supreme Court should provide guidelines and identify standards that could guide
future courts in determining whether an investigation is sufficient to avoid “cat’s
paw” liability.
IV. PUTTING AN END TO MONKEY BUSINESS IN THE WORKPLACE
As a result of the Vasquez decision, employees have been given greater
protection under Title VII. However, employers now face greater exposure to
liability in “cat’s paw” claims, especially in regard to how they investigate and

109. See, e.g., Staub, 562 U.S. at 421; Clack v. Rock-Tenn Co., 304 F. App’x 399, 408 (6th
Cir. 2008) (Moore, J. dissenting) (acknowledging that “the fact of an independent investigation is
an important factor”); EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 486 (10th Cir.
2006) (noting other Circuits’ acceptances of absolving employers when there is an independent
investigation); Collins v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 305 F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that
termination was proper after an independent investigation was based on “substantial evidence, of
an undisputedly independent, neutral, and unbiased adjudicator”).
110. See Staub, 562 U.S. at 421; Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., 354 F.3d 277, 289
(4th Cir. 2004); accord Sara Atherton Mason, Note, Cat’s Paw Cases: The Standard for Assessing
Subordinate Bias Liability, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 435, 446–47 (2011); Curtis J. Thomas, Note,
Cat’s in the Cradle: Tenth Circuit Provides Silver Spoon of Subordinate Bias Liability in EEOC v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 629, 663–64 (2008) (providing a general
discussion on independent investigations).
111. The EEOC argued in its appellate brief to the Supreme Court that “the more thorough,
balanced, and truly independent the investigation, the more likely the termination will be the result
of the investigation rather than the discriminatory input.” Brief for Respondent at 35, BCI CocaCola Bottling Co. of L.A. v. EEOC, 127 S. Ct. 852 (2007) (No. 06-341), 2007 WL 951131.
112. See Eber, supra note 18, at 194; see also Thomas, supra note 110, at 663 (“The
independent investigation requirement is correct because it serves the purpose of Title VII by
ensuring that employees who are the victims of intentional discrimination can recover even though
the persons who made the adverse employment decision did not act with any bias.”).
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respond to discrimination complaints.113 While the Vasquez decision and the
cases before it failed to clarify specific standards of a sufficient independent
investigation, some guidance can be found by looking at the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) guidelines and other court
decisions regarding Title VII “cat’s paw” claims.114
A. EEOC Guidelines
In 1999, the EEOC issued guidelines for the enforcement of vicarious liability
for unlawful harassment by supervisors.115 Although the guidelines were issued
specifically for discrimination by supervisors, they can easily be applied to
discrimination by co-workers. The EEOC urges employers to “set up a
mechanism for a prompt, thorough, and impartial investigation into alleged
[discrimination].”116 When choosing an investigator, the EEOC instructs that
“the individual who conducts the investigation [should] objectively gather and
consider the relevant facts.”117 Specifically, the investigator should be skilled
in interviewing and evaluating the credibility of witnesses, and the alleged
wrongdoer should not have any “direct or indirect control” over the
investigator.118
B. Judicial Guidance
One example of a sufficient independent investigation is found in Sirpal v.
University of Miami.119 In Sirpal, an Indian-American student claimed that
racial discrimination motivated his dismissal from both the University’s
graduate school and medical school.120 The Eleventh Circuit held that even if
113. See Dorrian, supra note 18.
114. See, e.g., Sirpal v. Univ. of Miami, 509 F. App’x 924, 927 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding that
the “cat’s paw” doctrine did not extend liability to the employer because it conducted a sufficient
independent investigation prior to dismissing the plaintiff-employee); Chattman v. Toho Tenax
Am., Inc., 686 F.3d 339, 353 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that the employer’s investigation was not
sufficiently independent to absolve it of vicarious liability); Jennings v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 496 F.3d
764, 765–66 (7th Cir. 2007) (demonstrating how employers can avoid vicarious liability by
conducting independent investigations before terminating employees); see generally U.S. EQUAL
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: VICARIOUS EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR
UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS (June 18, 1999), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/do
cs/harassment.pdf (last modified Mar. 29, 2010) [hereinafter EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE].
115. The EEOC’s use of the word harassment can be used interchangeably with discrimination.
See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 114, at 1–2 (“While the anti-discrimination
statutes seek to remedy discrimination, their primary purpose is to prevent violations. The Supreme
Court, in Faragher and Ellerth, relied on Commission guidance which has long advised employers
to take all necessary steps to prevent harassment.” (footnotes omitted)).
116. Id. at 14.
117. Id. at 15.
118. Id.
119. 509 F. App’x 924 (11th Cir. 2013).
120. Id. at 925–26. The independent investigations revealed that Sirpal had engaged in
misconduct and unethical behavior in the graduate school’s lab where he worked and that there
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Sirpal’s claims of racial discrimination were true, this was not a “cat’s paw” case
because “each school conducted some sort of investigation,” both of which
determined that, notwithstanding evidence of peripheral racial animus, his
dismissal was justified by his misconduct and unethical behavior.121 The court
noted that the investigations were sufficiently independent to support such a
finding because each one included a hearing at which Sirpal was able to testify.
Then, after the decision to dismiss him was reached by the Graduate Committee,
Sirpal was able to appeal the decision to the Associate Dean for Graduate
Studies.122
Jennings v. Illinois Department of Corrections,123 provides another example
of a sufficient independent investigation. This case involved a Title VII claim
filed by a Mexican-American prison guard who was terminated for smuggling
contraband cigars into the prison and trading them with inmates.124 The prison’s
warden initiated an independent investigation upon discovering cigars in the
possession of an inmate.125
Eight inmates were interviewed before the investigator concluded that
Jennings had engaged in the prohibited conduct. Based on the results of the
investigation, a disciplinary hearing was held before the Employee Review
Board, which in turn recommended a discharge.126 After Jennings was officially
terminated, an independent arbitrator upheld the termination finding that the
termination “was appropriate in light of the seriousness of the misconduct and
Jennings’ recent disciplinary history.”127 The Seventh Circuit found that the
independent investigation conducted by the independent investigator and
subsequent arbitration were sufficient to break “any connection between [the
supervisor’s alleged] improper motivations” and the adverse action.128

were some serious questions regarding the data he used in an article he was writing for the medical
school. Id. at 927.
121. Id. (“Therefore, even if Sirpal’s supervisor, Dr. Potter, had submitted to the Graduate
Committee a report that ‘rubberstamped’ the discriminatory animus of Sirpal’s harassers as Sirpal
alleges, this is not a cat’s paw case because the independent investigation determined that dismissal
was, apart from Dr. Potter’s recommendation, entirely justified.”).
122. Noting the thoroughness of the appeal process, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized that “Dr.
John Bixby, Associate Dean for Graduate Studies for the medical school, met with the Graduate
Committee members, the University Security Officer who had investigated one of the allegations
of misconduct, the lab manager, Ms. Jones, and Sirpal.” Id.
123. 496 F.3d 764 (7th Cir. 2007).
124. Id. at 765. Jennings claimed he was fired because of his national origin and presented
evidence of discriminatory remarks made about him and other Hispanic employees, including that
he was called a “lazy Mexican” shortly before he was investigated. Id. at 766.
125. Id. at 765.
126. Id. at 765–66.
127. Id. at 766.
128. The Seventh Circuit noted that there was no evidence that the warden, the investigator, or
the arbitrator “bore any discriminatory animus towards Mexican-Americans or Jennings’ in
particular.” Id. at 769.

2018]

Cat Scratch Fever

429

In contrast, Chattman v. Toho Tenax America, Inc.129 is an example of
circumstances when a court held that an independent investigation did not
absolve the employer from “cat’s paw” liability. Chattman involved a Title VII
claim alleging that an African American employee’s disqualification from
promotion considerations was based on a disciplinary action issued against him
by his racially-biased supervisor.130 The Sixth Circuit held that the investigation
conducted by the employer did not protect it from liability because the
supervisor “was ‘involved in some parts of the discussion’ regarding Chattman’s
discipline and non-promotion.”131 It further found that the investigation was not
entirely unrelated to the HR manager’s biased recommendation because the
manager “both misinformed and selectively informed [the ultimate decisionmaker] about the incident.”132
C. Practitioner Tips
Although both the EEOC guidelines and judicial decisions do not generally
provide clear-cut standards for sufficient independent investigations, there are a
few key measures employers can put into practice to ensure that a sufficient
independent investigation is conducted.133
First, interview both the employee making the report or recommendation and
the subject of the report or recommendation, and review all evidence proffered
by each.134 Second, interview all witnesses to the alleged wrongdoing or others
who may have knowledge of the complaint, and review any additional evidence
they may provide. Finally, make certain the investigation remains impartial at

129. 686 F.3d 339 (6th Cir. 2012).
130. As evidence that his supervisor was biased against African Americans, Chattman pointed
to two instances in which his supervisor made racially hostile statements. First, in response to
another employee’s comment about her son fighting at school, the supervisor allegedly responded,
“[y]ou know what my grandmother always says about boys scuffling? That’s how the nigger
graveyard got full.” Then, when commenting on then-Presidential-candidate Barack Obama, the
supervisor said, “[w]ell you better look close at Obama’s running mate because Americans won’t
allow a nigger president.” Id. at 343.
131. Id. at 353.
132. Id.
133. See Aaron J. Graf, Avoiding and Defending Claims of Cat’s Paw Liability in Employment
Discrimination Cases, WDC JOURNAL (Mar. 21, 2016), http://www.wdc-online.org/wdc-journal/
archived-editions/avoiding-and-defending-claims-cats-paw-liability-employment (“[I]t can be said
that a cat’s paw theory is unlikely to be brought, or will easily be defeated, where the decision
maker: (1) performs their own independent investigation of the grounds supporting the employment
action; (2) relies almost exclusively on testimony or documents created by unbiased or disinterested
individuals instead of on the individual initially making the recommendation; and (3) provides the
employee a brief opportunity to rebut or disprove the allegations.”).
134. For recommendations regarding guidelines for independent investigations, see Rachel
Santoro, Comment, Narrowing the Cat’s Paw: An Argument for a Uniform Subordinate Bias
Liability Standard, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 823, 836–41 (2009), and see also Katherine GonzálezValentín, Who’s Burning Now? Avoiding “Cat’s Paw” Liability Through Proper Predisciplinary
Investigation, 59 FED. LAW. 20, 22 (2012).
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all stages by ensuring the employee reporting the wrongdoing or making the
recommendation has no authority or influence over the investigator. This
includes ensuring the employee reporting the wrongdoing or making the
recommendation is not involved in discussions regarding the investigation
beyond his or her report or recommendation.
Furthermore, employers can minimize the risk of liability in “cat’s paw”
claims by: (1) adopting, educating, and training all employees—supervisors and
lower-level alike—on anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation policies; (2)
keeping detailed disciplinary and performance records; and (3) making sure that
all similarly-situated employees are subject to similar disciplinary actions.135
V. CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit’s recognition of “cat’s paw” liability in co-worker
discrimination and retaliation claims represents a positive step in the attempt to
protect employees from discrimination and is an effective response to the
nationwide problem of workplace discrimination and retaliation.136 Other
Circuits should adopt the First and Second Circuit’s expansion of “cat’s paw”
cases to co-workers. Further, the expansion of the “cat’s paw” doctrine to
include co-worker bias should motivate employers to reexamine their existing
personnel practices in order to eliminate discriminatory and retaliatory bias from
playing a role in employment decisions.137
Despite the positive impact that the Vasquez decision and the “cat’s paw”
cases before it will have in employment discrimination law, they have left
unanswered the standards employers should follow when conducting
independent investigations in order to avoid “cat’s paw” liability. Employers
must keep in mind that an employee’s discriminatory or retaliatory actions may
be a causal factor in an adverse employment action where there is no evidence
that the adverse action was not justified for reasons apart from the biased
employee’s report. Although it is always important to thoroughly investigate
135. This is a recommendation commonly made by human resources representatives across all
industries. See Ivo Becica, More than Just a Fable—Why the “Cat’s Paw” Matters for Employers,
HR LEGALIST (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.hrlegalist.com/2015/04/more-than-just-a-fable-whythe-cats-paw-matters-for-employers/.
136. Discrimination continues to be a pervasive problem in the workplace. In Fiscal Year
2016, the EEOC received 91,503 charges and secured more than $482 million for victims of
discrimination. What You Should Know: EEOC’s Fiscal Year 2016 Highlights, U.S. EQUAL EMPL.
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/2016_highlights.cfm (last
visited Apr. 6, 2018).
137. See, e.g., Legal Alert: Cat’s Paw Theory of Discrimination Adopted by 2nd Circuit,
FISHER PHILLIPS (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.fisherphillips.com/resources-alerts-cat-s-paw-theor
y-of-discrimination-adopted-by-2nd-circuit; Brian Hall, 2nd Circuit “Cat’s Paw” Decision
Highlights Importance of Employer Investigations Before Termination, PORTER WRIGHT:
EMPLOYER L. REP. (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.employerlawreport.com/2016/09/articles/trapsfor-the-unwary/2nd-circuit-cats-paw-decision-highlights-importance-of-employer-investigationsbefore-termination/.
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discrimination complaints with a critical eye toward potential bias, the Second
Circuit’s decision makes it even more so.
Until clear standards are provided for deciding when an investigation will be
sufficiently independent, it will be left to the courts to define what constitutes a
“sufficient independent investigation” that absolves employers from liability in
“cat’s paw” claims. Thus, employers must take discrimination and retaliation
complaints seriously by verifying that adverse employment actions are justified,
properly supported, and based on non-discriminatory reasons.

